Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints

DOI10.1137/17M1149717zbMATH Open1432.91088MaRDI QIDQ5232161FDOQ5232161

Authors: Naoyuki Kamiyama 

Publication date: 29 August 2019

Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epubs.siam.org/doi/pdf/10.1137/17M1149717

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zbMATH Keywords

matroidstable matchingPareto efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial aspects of matroids and geometric lattices (05B35) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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Cited In (15)

• Efficient matching under general constraints
• A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
• Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
• A matroid generalization of the super-stable matching problem
• Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Generalized matchings for preferences represented by simplest semiorder: stability and Pareto optimality
• The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
• On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings
• Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences
• A new approach to the Pareto stable matching problem
• Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
• Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties

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