Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
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Publication:523512
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005zbMath1400.90148OpenAlexW2594658337MaRDI QIDQ523512
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ier.snu.ac.kr/activity/working-papers?md=download&seqidx=32
strategy-proofnessqueueing problem\(k\)-pivotal rules\(k\)-welfare lower boundidentical costs lower boundqueue-efficiency
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No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects, No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem, Egalitarianism in the queueing problem, Recent developments in the queueing problem, Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems, No-envy in the Queueing Problem with Multiple Identical Machines
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