Cryptographic defense against traffic analysis

DOI10.1145/167088.167260zbMath1310.94166OpenAlexW1979797552MaRDI QIDQ5248538

Daniel Simon, Charles W. Rackoff

Publication date: 7 May 2015

Published in: Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '93 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/167088.167260

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (10)

Private authentication ⋮ Anonymous Communication and Anonymous Cash ⋮ Secure Multi-party Shuffling ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Poly onions: achieving anonymity in the presence of churn ⋮ Instantiability of classical random-oracle-model encryption transforms ⋮ Shuffling large decks of cards and the Bernoulli-Laplace urn model ⋮ New bounds for randomized busing ⋮ Provable unlinkability against traffic analysis with low message overhead ⋮ An efficient protocol for anonymous multicast and reception.

This page was built for publication: Cryptographic defense against traffic analysis