Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0501-YzbMATH Open1388.91109OpenAlexW1783515297MaRDI QIDQ524978FDOQ524978

Authors: Patrick Hummel, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii 

Publication date: 27 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0501-y

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zbMATH Keywords

auctionsadvertiser networksadvertising exchanges

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Glimpses of Benoît Mandelbrot (1924--2010)

Cited In (1)

• Multi-sided advertising markets: dynamic mechanisms and incremental user compensations

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