Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0501-YMaRDI QIDQ524978zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick Hummel, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii

Publication date 27 April 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0501-y

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsadvertiser networksadvertising exchanges

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
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• Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction
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Cites work

• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Glimpses of Benoît Mandelbrot (1924--2010)
• Optimal Auction Design
• Ranking asymmetric auctions

Cited in

(1)

• Multi-sided advertising markets: dynamic mechanisms and incremental user compensations

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