Liars, lotteries, and prefaces: two paraconsistent accounts of belief change

DOI10.1007/978-94-007-7759-0_7MaRDI QIDQ5250308zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edwin D. Mares

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7759-0_7

zbMATH Keywords

liar paradoxlottery paradoxparaconsistent belief changeparaconsistent consequence relationpreface paradoxreject setrelevance logicRussell's paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Paraconsistent logics (03B53)

Recommendations

• Belief change and inconsistency
• A Simple Nonmonotonic Logic as a Model of Belief Change
• AGM-like paraconsistent belief change
• Belief revision, probabilism, and logic choice
• Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference

Cited in

(4)

• Belief change and inconsistency
• The preface paradox dissolved
• Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference
• Psychophysiological approach to the liar paradox: Jean Buridan's virtual entailment principle put to the test

This page was built for publication: Liars, lotteries, and prefaces: two paraconsistent accounts of belief change

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5250308)