Truth and Proof in Intuitionism

DOI10.1007/978-94-007-4435-6_3zbMath1312.03039OpenAlexW98987606MaRDI QIDQ5253923

Dag Prawitz

Publication date: 5 June 2015

Published in: Epistemology versus Ontology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4435-6_3

zbMATH Keywords

truthproofintuitionism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Intuitionistic mathematics (03F55)

Related Items (7)

Proofs, grounds and empty functions: epistemic compulsion in Prawitz's semantics ⋮ Negative predication and distinctness ⋮ Objectivity and Truth in Mathematics: A Sober Non-platonist Perspective ⋮ Necessity of Thought ⋮ Program Testing and the Meaning Explanations of Intuitionistic Type Theory ⋮ Truth as an epistemic notion ⋮ Denotational semantics for languages of epistemic grounding based on Prawitz's theory of grounds

Cites Work

• The epistemic significance of valid inference
• Intuitionism. An introduction
• Constructions, proofs and the meaning of logical constants
• Constructivism in mathematics. An introduction. Volume II
• On the idea of a general proof theory
• Truth as an epistemic notion
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