Query complexity of approximate nash equilibria

DOI10.1145/2591796.2591829zbMATH Open1315.91003arXiv1306.6686OpenAlexW1981247840MaRDI QIDQ5259589FDOQ5259589

Authors: Yakov Babichenko 

Publication date: 26 June 2015

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players $n$. Our main result states that for $n$-player binary-action games and for constant $varepsilon$, the query complexity of an $varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in $n$. One of the consequences of this result is an exponential lower bound on the rate of convergence of adaptive dynamics to approxiamte Nash equilibrium.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.6686

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zbMATH Keywords

rate of convergenceadaptive dynamicsgame theorycomplexityfixed pointquery complexityapproximate Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Approximation algorithms (68W25) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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Cited In (12)

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• The query complexity of correlated equilibria
• Logarithmic query complexity for approximate Nash computation in large games
• Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
• Query complexity of approximate equilibria in anonymous games
• Query complexity of approximate equilibria in anonymous games
• ETR-completeness for decision versions of multi-player (symmetric) Nash equilibria
• Inapproximability of Nash Equilibrium
• Empirical distribution of equilibrium play and its testing application
• Learning convex partitions and computing game-theoretic equilibria from best response queries
• Logarithmic Query Complexity for Approximate Nash Computation in Large Games
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Uses Software

• SuLQ

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