Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_24zbMATH Open1315.91046OpenAlexW18878619MaRDI QIDQ5261496FDOQ5261496

Authors: Fernanda A. Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira 

Publication date: 3 July 2015

Published in: Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear Physical Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_24

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zbMATH Keywords

Cournot duopolymixed duopolyprivatizationtax rateStackelberg duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cited In (4)

• Privatization and government preference: Cournot vs Bertrand models
• Research on the privatization policy-taking the mixed duopoly industry as the example
• Domestic and international price-setting mixed triopolies
• Market-demand boosting and privatization in a mixed duopoly

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