Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_24MaRDI QIDQ5261496zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fernanda A. Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira

Publication date 3 July 2015

Published in Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear Physical Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_24

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot duopolymixed duopolyprivatizationtax rateStackelberg duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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• Domestic and international price-setting mixed triopolies
• Market-demand boosting and privatization in a mixed duopoly

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