The toy model with two strong players in a weighted voting game

DOI10.14708/ma.v42i2.524zbMath1367.91062OpenAlexW2089038953MaRDI QIDQ5274809

Andrzej Tomski

Publication date: 6 July 2017

Published in: Mathematica Applicanda (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.14708/ma.v42i2.524

zbMATH Keywords

normal approximationPenrose-Banzhaf indexoptimal quotatwo strong players in a weighted voting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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