Self-Confirming Equilibrium
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Publication:5287205
DOI10.2307/2951716zbMath0796.90072MaRDI QIDQ5287205
David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 15 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64209
91A10: Noncooperative games
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