How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
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Publication:5289335
DOI10.2307/2298060zbMath0774.90019MaRDI QIDQ5289335
Publication date: 23 August 1993
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298060
91B62: Economic growth models
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B44: Economics of information
91E40: Memory and learning in psychology
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