Factoring multi-power RSA modulus N = p^r q with partial known bits
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Publication:5300936
Recommendations
- Further improvement of factoring \(N=p^rq^s\) with partial known bits
- Factoring multi-power RSA moduli with primes sharing least or most significant bits
- Factoring RSA moduli with primes sharing bits in the middle
- Factoring unbalanced moduli with known bits
- A new partial key exposure attack on multi-power RSA
Cited in
(16)- Revisiting RSA-polynomial problem and semiprime factorization
- Factoring multi-power RSA moduli with primes sharing least or most significant bits
- Small CRT-Exponent RSA Revisited
- On RSA moduli with half of the bits prescribed
- Towards optimal bounds for implicit factorization problem
- Factoring multi power RSA moduli with a class of secret exponents
- Further improvement of factoring \(N=p^rq^s\) with partial known bits
- Cryptanalysis of an RSA variant with moduli \(N=p^r q^l\)
- Factoring unbalanced moduli with known bits
- Improved Herrmann-May's attack with merging variables and lower LLL bound
- Factoring RSA modulus using prime reconstruction from random known bits
- An attack on \(N = p^2q\) with partially known bits on the multiple of the prime factors
- Further results on implicit factoring in polynomial time
- Small CRT-exponent RSA revisited
- Partial key exposure attacks on Prime Power RSA with non-consecutive blocks
- Solving Linear Equations Modulo Divisors: On Factoring Given Any Bits
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