Publication:5302857
From MaRDI portal
zbMath1168.91007MaRDI QIDQ5302857
Publication date: 14 January 2009
Borda count; majority vote; positional voting rules; ranking wheel; Condorcet winer; plurality vote; reversal profiles
91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
91B12: Voting theory
91F10: History, political science
91B14: Social choice
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