Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?*
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Publication:5306833
DOI10.1162/QJEC.2010.125.1.363zbMath1202.91230OpenAlexW2113598396MaRDI QIDQ5306833
Alessandro Riboni, Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia
Publication date: 12 April 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.363
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)
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