Stability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Quantum Games
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Abstract: In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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