Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.026zbMATH Open1211.91144OpenAlexW2028520635MaRDI QIDQ533950FDOQ533950

Authors: Xu Tan, Yiqing Xing 

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.026

Recommendations

• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Common-value auctions with discrete private information
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
• Auctions with resale and risk aversion

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetrysecond-price auctionresalemonotone equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects
• Auctions with a random number of identical bidders
• The private value single item bisection auction

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