Faithful Implementations of Distributed Algorithms and Control Laws
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Publication:5358533
DOI10.1109/TCNS.2015.2489318zbMATH Open1371.91073arXiv1309.4372WikidataQ114985081 ScholiaQ114985081MaRDI QIDQ5358533FDOQ5358533
Authors: Takashi Tanaka, Farhad Farokhi, Cédric Langbort 
Publication date: 21 September 2017
Published in: IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: When a distributed algorithm must be executed by strategic agents with misaligned interests, a social leader needs to introduce an appropriate tax/subsidy mechanism to incentivize agents to faithfully implement the intended algorithm so that a correct outcome is obtained. We discuss the incentive issues of implementing economically efficient distributed algorithms using the framework of indirect mechanism design theory. In particular, we show that indirect Groves mechanisms are not only sufficient but also necessary to achieve incentive compatibility. This result can be viewed as a generalization of the Green-Laffont theorem to indirect mechanisms. Then we introduce the notion of asymptotic incentive compatibility as an appropriate solution concept to faithfully implement distributed and iterative optimization algorithms. We consider two special types of optimization algorithms: dual decomposition algorithms for resource allocation and average consensus algorithms.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.4372
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Distributed algorithms (68W15) Decentralized systems (93A14)
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