Publication:5365074
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zbMath1377.91102MaRDI QIDQ5365074
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Tim Roughgarden
Publication date: 29 September 2017
Full work available at URL: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2133091
91B52: Special types of economic equilibria
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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