Cyber Physical Attacks with Control Objectives
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5375223
zbMATH Open1395.94274arXiv1607.05927MaRDI QIDQ5375223FDOQ5375223
Authors: Yuan Chen, Soummya Kar, José M. F. Moura
Publication date: 14 September 2018
Abstract: This paper studies attackers with control objectives against cyber-physical systems (CPS). The system is equipped with its own controller and attack detector, and the goal of the attacker is to move the system to a target state while altering the system's actuator input and sensor output to avoid detection. We formulate a cost function that reflects the attacker's goals, and, using dynamic programming, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate. By changing the parameters of the cost function, we show how an attacker can design optimal attacks to balance the control objective and the detection avoidance objective. Finally, we provide a numerical illustration based on a remotely-controlled helicopter under attack.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.05927
Filtering in stochastic control theory (93E11) Cryptography (94A60) Applications of design theory to circuits and networks (94C30)
Cited In (14)
- False data injection attacks on sensors against state estimation in cyber-physical systems
- Optimal deception attacks against remote state estimation in cyber-physical systems
- Vulnerability analysis for a class of nonlinear cyber-physical systems under stealthy attacks
- Detection of stealthy false data injection attacks against cyber-physical systems: a stochastic coding scheme
- Analysis of stealthy false data injection attacks against networked control systems: three case studies
- Optimal strictly stealthy attacks in cyber-physical systems with multiple channels under the energy constraint
- Stealthy switching attacks on sensors against state estimation in cyber‐physical systems
- Vulnerability analysis of distributed state estimation under joint deception attacks
- Quickest physical watermarking-based detection of measurement replacement attacks in networked control systems
- Quickest detection of deception attacks on cyber-physical systems with a parsimonious watermarking policy
- Security of networked control systems subject to deception attacks: a survey
- Malicious adversaries against secure state estimation: Sparse sensor attack design
- Worst-case \(\varepsilon \)-stealthy false data injection attacks in cyber-physical systems
- Two-channel stealthy false data injection attacks design without estimator knowledge
This page was built for publication: Cyber Physical Attacks with Control Objectives
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5375223)