Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals
From MaRDI portal
Publication:537549
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0511-4zbMATH Open1232.91598OpenAlexW2051424146MaRDI QIDQ537549FDOQ537549
Authors: Maria E. Gallego, David Scoones 
Publication date: 20 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0511-4
Recommendations
- Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
- Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preference
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1149809
- Rank effects in bargaining: evidence from government formation
- Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
- Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
- Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
- On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems
Cites Work
- The bargaining problem
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
- A Criterion for Comparing Strength of Preference with an Application to Bargaining
- The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
- Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
- A Theory of Divided Government
- On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents
- Federal mandates with local agenda setters
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
This page was built for publication: Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q537549)
