Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0511-4zbMath1232.91598OpenAlexW2051424146MaRDI QIDQ537549

David Scoones, Maria E. Gallego

Publication date: 20 May 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0511-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
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• The Bargaining Problem
• A Criterion for Comparing Strength of Preference with an Application to Bargaining
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
• A Theory of Divided Government

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