Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry

DOI10.3982/ECTA10293zbMath1294.91063OpenAlexW2130635919MaRDI QIDQ5417249

Tong Li, Matthew Gentry

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10293

zbMATH Keywords

identificationauctionsendogenous participation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (13)

Accounting for endogeneity in regression models using copulas: a step-by-step guide for empirical studies ⋮ A STUDY OF PARTICIPATION IN DYNAMIC AUCTIONS ⋮ Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance ⋮ Auctions with selective entry ⋮ How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? ⋮ Two results on auctions with endogenous entry ⋮ Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry ⋮ Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions ⋮ Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity ⋮ Inference for first-price auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator ⋮ AUCTION–LOTTERY HYBRID MECHANISMS: STRUCTURAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ⋮ Quantile regression methods for first-price auctions ⋮ Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions

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