The welfare cost of one-size-fits-all patent protection
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Cites work
- A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction
- Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model
- Effects of blocking patents on R\&D: a quantitative DGE analysis
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intellectual property rights protection and endogenous economic growth
- On time inconsistency: A technical issue in Stackelberg differential games
- Patent policy in an endogenous growth model
- Patents in a model of endogenous growth
- The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models
- Time-consistent policies
Cited in
(13)- Welfare analysis of uniform entry tax in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous industries
- When does elastic labor supply cause an inverted-U effect of patents on innovation?
- Sequential R\&D and blocking patents in the dynamics of growth
- Leapfrogging cycles in international competition
- The struggle to survive in the R\&D sector: implications for innovation and growth
- Sector-specific IPR protection to overcome technology-skill mismatch in south? A simple model
- Optimal mix of R\&D subsidy and patent protection in a heterogeneous-industry R\&D-based growth model
- Disruptive innovation by heterogeneous incumbents and economic growth: when do incumbents switch to new technology?
- Optimal patent length and breadth in an economy with creative destruction and non-diversifiable risk
- Patent replacement and welfare gains
- On the optimal mix of patent instruments
- Dynamic effects of patent policy on innovation and inequality in a Schumpeterian economy
- Global patent protection: channels of North and South welfare gain
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