Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
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Publication:5441623
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00765.xzbMath1142.91467MaRDI QIDQ5441623
Publication date: 15 February 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~dabreu/index_files/12-06-2006MASTER.pdf
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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