On the Importance of Public-Key Validation in the MQV and HMQV Key Agreement Protocols

DOI10.1007/11941378_11zbMATH Open1175.94092OpenAlexW1488807031WikidataQ57485796 ScholiaQ57485796MaRDI QIDQ5458271FDOQ5458271

Authors: Berkant Ustaoglu, Alfred Menezes 

Publication date: 11 April 2008

Published in: Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2006 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11147/4782

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cited In (10)

• Methodology for assessing the security of cryptographic protocols
• On reusing ephemeral keys in Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols
• Digital friend-or-foe authentication
• Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol
• Lattice-Based Fault Attacks Against ECMQV
• Another look at automated theorem-proving
• Another look at HMQV
• Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
• Decaf: Eliminating Cofactors Through Point Compression
• Designing efficient authenticated key exchange resilient to leakage of ephemeral secret keys

Uses Software

• HMQV

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