Security of NMAC and HMAC Based on Non-malleability
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Recommendations
- The exact PRF-security of NMAC and HMAC
- New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: security without collision resistance
- On the Security of HMAC and NMAC Based on HAVAL, MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 (Extended Abstract)
- On Authentication with HMAC and Non-random Properties
- New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security Without Collision-Resistance
- Improved security analysis for nonce-based enhanced hash-then-mask MACs
- Generic security of NMAC and HMAC with input whitening
- On the security of two MAC algorithms
- Nonmalleable Cryptography
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2009976 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1418299 (Why is no real title available?)
- Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1
- Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions
- Foundations of non-malleable hash and one-way functions
- How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions
- Keying hash functions for message authentication
- New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security Without Collision-Resistance
- On the Security of HMAC and NMAC Based on HAVAL, MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 (Extended Abstract)
Cited in
(7)- The exact PRF-security of NMAC and HMAC
- New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: security without collision resistance
- New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security Without Collision-Resistance
- Witness authenticating NIZKs and applications
- Delayed-key message authentication for streams
- Expedient Non-malleability Notions for Hash Functions
- Basing PRFs on Constant-Query Weak PRFs: Minimizing Assumptions for Efficient Symmetric Cryptography
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