Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00317zbMath1121.91342MaRDI QIDQ5474986

Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d12/d1248.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B44: Economics of information

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

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