Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094
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(80)- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
- On the types of information and mechanism design
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Mechanism design for land acquisition
- Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
- Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
- Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- When does centralization undermine adaptation?
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty
- Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
- Strategic disaggregation in matching markets
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
- Ex-ante versus ex-post destination information model for on-demand service ride-sharing platform
- Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
- Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- Index-wise comparative statics
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Mechanism design with information acquisition
- Optimal search auctions
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Information acquisition in committees
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
- What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
- Information acquisition during a Dutch auction
- Information acquisition during a descending auction
- Implementation in an interdependent value framework
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
- A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information concentration in common value environments
- Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
- Information Acquisition and Welfare
- Monopoly insurance and endogenous information
- The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
- Unrestricted information acquisition
- When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
- Signaling covertly acquired information
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- The insider's curse
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Algorithmic mechanism design with investment
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
- Moral hazard in data envelopment analysis benchmarking
- Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
- A vaccine auction
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
- Investment subsidies with spillovers and endogenous private information: why Pigou got it all right
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
- The value of information for auctioneers
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
- Bargaining with endogenous information
- Ex post implementation
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
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