Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00360zbMath1141.91311MaRDI QIDQ5475015

Mark Stegeman, Martin Dufwenberg

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00360

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

91A07: Games with infinitely many players

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

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