A Structural Model of Government Formation
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Publication:5476207
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00389zbMath1184.91188MaRDI QIDQ5476207
Daniel Diermeier, Antonio Merlo, Hülya Eraslan
Publication date: 29 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00389
coalitions; bargaining; government formation; political stability; comparative constitutional design; government dissolution
91F10: History, political science
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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