Rationalizable implementation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.12.011MaRDI QIDQ548264zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date 28 June 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.011

zbMATH Keywords

implementationrationalizabilityrobust mechanism designcomplete informationrobust implementationmaskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Bayesian Implementation
• Continuous implementation
• Exact implementation
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable implementation
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(30)

• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
• Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
• Full implementation in backward induction
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
• Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
• Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
• Rationalizability in general situations
• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Rationalizable implementation
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
• Iterated bounded dominance
• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
• A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
• A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
• Interim rationalizable implementation of functions
• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
• Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context

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