DISCOUNT WINDOW POLICY, BANKING CRISES, AND INDETERMINACY OF EQUILIBRIUM

DOI10.1017/S1365100506050097zbMath1102.91043OpenAlexW2048439077MaRDI QIDQ5489149

Todd Keister, Gaetano Antinolfi

Publication date: 25 September 2006

Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100506050097

zbMATH Keywords

investmentFriedman ruleliquidity crisisdiscount window lending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (8)

Imperfect interbank markets and the lender of last resort ⋮ Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks ⋮ USEFULNESS OF THE CONSTRAINED PLANNING PROBLEM IN A MODEL OF MONEY ⋮ Optimal monetary rules under persistent shocks ⋮ LIQUIDITY PROVISION AND BANKING CRISES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS ⋮ Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity? ⋮ Banking crises and liquidity in a monetary economy ⋮ Asset prices and standing facilities in a monetary economy

Cites Work

• Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Monetary stability and liquidity crises: The role of the lender of last resort

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