DISCOUNT WINDOW POLICY, BANKING CRISES, AND INDETERMINACY OF EQUILIBRIUM
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Publication:5489149
DOI10.1017/S1365100506050097zbMATH Open1102.91043OpenAlexW2048439077MaRDI QIDQ5489149FDOQ5489149
Authors: Gaetano Antinolfi, Todd Keister 
Publication date: 25 September 2006
Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100506050097
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Cites Work
Cited In (9)
- Optimal monetary rules under persistent shocks
- USEFULNESS OF THE CONSTRAINED PLANNING PROBLEM IN A MODEL OF MONEY
- Asset prices and standing facilities in a monetary economy
- Imperfect interbank markets and the lender of last resort
- Banking crises and liquidity in a monetary economy
- Monetary stability and liquidity crises: The role of the lender of last resort
- LIQUIDITY PROVISION AND BANKING CRISES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
- Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks
- Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity?
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