Risk aversion in maintenance: overmaintenance and the principal-agent problem
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Publication:5490631
DOI10.1093/IMAMAN/DPI028zbMath1137.90437OpenAlexW2119347267MaRDI QIDQ5490631
Publication date: 4 October 2006
Published in: IMA Journal of Management Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/imaman/dpi028
utility functionincentivesprincipal-agent problemage-based replacementblock maintenanceovermaintenance
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25)
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