Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk

DOI10.1145/1011767.1011769zbMath1321.94072OpenAlexW2095077828MaRDI QIDQ5501478

Chris Peikert, Silvio Micali, Matt Lepinski, Abhi Shelat

Publication date: 3 August 2015

Published in: Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1011767.1011769

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycorrelated equilibriummechanism designsecure function evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Cryptography (94A60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Partial fairness in secure two-party computation ⋮ Utility dependence in correct and fair rational secret sharing ⋮ Resource fairness and composability of cryptographic protocols ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol ⋮ Collusion-Free Protocols in the Mediated Model ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information ⋮ Fair Threshold Decryption with Semi-Trusted Third Parties ⋮ On Complete Primitives for Fairness ⋮ Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks

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