Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes

DOI10.1145/1011767.1011781zbMATH Open1322.91012OpenAlexW2040940409MaRDI QIDQ5501487FDOQ5501487

Authors: Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes 

Publication date: 3 August 2015

Published in: Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4054443

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zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilitycomputational mechanism designfailure modelsdistributed algorithmic mechanism designalgorithm compatibilitycommunication compatibilityrational failurerational manipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Distributed algorithms (68W15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Distributed systems (68M14) Network protocols (68M12)

Cited In (6)

• Rationality in the Full-Information Model
• An incentive-based distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks
• Secure message transmission on directed networks
• Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
• A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
• Incentive-compatible interdomain routing

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