Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007zbMath1217.91034OpenAlexW3121810695MaRDI QIDQ550195

Rebecca B. Morton, Jean-Robert Tyran

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationvotinginformation aggregationswing voter's curse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study ⋮ Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study ⋮ Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups ⋮ The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting ⋮ Unanimous rules in the laboratory ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice ⋮ Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments ⋮ The swing voter's curse in social networks

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria