Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.09.007zbMATH Open1217.91034OpenAlexW3121810695MaRDI QIDQ550195FDOQ550195

Authors: Rebecca B. Morton, Jean-Robert Tyran 

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007

Recommendations

• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• Voting with public information

zbMATH Keywords

votingasymmetric informationinformation aggregationswing voter's curse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The swing voter's curse in the laboratory
• When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
• Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types

Cited In (9)

• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
• The swing voter's curse in social networks
• Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
• Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
• Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups
• Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Unanimous rules in the laboratory

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

This page was built for publication: Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q550195)