Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.10.005zbMATH Open1217.91068OpenAlexW1981343919MaRDI QIDQ550205FDOQ550205

Authors: Emiel Maasland, Maarten C. W. Janssen, Vladimir A. Karamychev 

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.005

Recommendations

• Auctions with selective entry
• On the sub-optimality of entry fees in auctions with entry
• Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
• Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionsrevenuenegative externalityentry fee

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
• Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note

Cited In (5)

• Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
• Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note
• Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
• Auctions with an Invitation Cost
• Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry

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