Security Bounds for Quantum Cryptography with Finite Resources

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Publication:5503299

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-89304-2_8zbMATH Open1162.94399arXiv0806.0120OpenAlexW1599958972MaRDI QIDQ5503299FDOQ5503299


Authors: Valerio Scarani, R. Renner Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 13 January 2009

Published in: Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication, and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: A practical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol necessarily runs in finite time and, hence, only a finite amount of communication is exchanged. This is in contrast to most of the standard results on the security of QKD, which only hold in the limit where the number of transmitted signals approaches infinity. Here, we analyze the security of QKD under the realistic assumption that the amount of communication is finite. At the level of the general formalism, we present new results that help simplifying the actual implementation of QKD protocols: in particular, we show that symmetrization steps, which are required by certain security proofs (e.g., proofs based on de Finetti's representation theorem), can be omitted in practical implementations. Also, we demonstrate how two-way reconciliation protocols can be taken into account in the security analysis. At the level of numerical estimates, we present the bounds with finite resources for ``device-independent security against collective attacks.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0806.0120




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