Weakening the perfect encryption assumption in Dolev-Yao adversaries

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2005.03.006zbMath1068.94023OpenAlexW2036385788MaRDI QIDQ557896

Pierpaolo Degano, Roberto Zunino

Publication date: 30 June 2005

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2005.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

Probabilistic modelSecurityFormal methodsAuthenticationComputational approachSecrecy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.) (68Q60) Network protocols (68M12) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (2)

Sound approximate and asymptotic probabilistic bisimulations for PCTL ⋮ Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and a cost-sensitive guessing intruder is NP-complete

Uses Software

• Interrogator

Cites Work

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• Bisimulation through probabilistic testing
• A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
• Static analysis for the \(\pi\)-calculus with applications to security
• Secrecy by typing in security protocols
• The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
• Symmetric Authentication within a Simulatable Cryptographic Library
• Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures

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