Computing Equilibria of N-Person Games

DOI10.1137/0121011MaRDI QIDQ5605046zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Robert Wilson

Publication date 1971

Published in SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/0121011

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cited in

(14)

• Copositive-plus Lemke algorithm solves polymatrix games
• A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game
• On the multiplicity of solutions in generation capacity investment models with incomplete markets: a risk-averse stochastic equilibrium approach
• A mixed 0-1 linear programming approach to the computation of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of a finite \(n\)-person game in normal form
• Network formation and pairwise stability: a new oddness theorem
• Affective empathy in non-cooperative games
• Strategic decompositions of normal form games: zero-sum games and potential games
• Regular potential games
• Nash equilibria: complexity, symmetries, and approximation
• Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs
• Electoral decisions: the role of the government in power, the opposition and the voters. An approach from the perspective of game theory
• A vector bundle approach to Nash equilibria
• Unknottedness of graphs of pairwise stable networks \& network dynamics
• A sequence-form differentiable path-following method to compute Nash equilibria

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