A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5704116
DOI10.1287/moor.28.1.103.14256zbMath1082.90096MaRDI QIDQ5704116
Publication date: 11 November 2005
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/aff59c6a75541c63b50c897161a6d29ed8c04c83
Related Items
A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries, On Lattice and DA, Polyhedral Aspects of Stable Marriage, On the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market, Popular Matchings with Ties and Matroid Constraints, The Generalized Median Stable Matchings: Finding Them Is Not That Easy, On weighted kernels of two posets., Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas, Matching with aggregate externalities, Median stable matchings in two-sided markets, The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts, The popular matching and condensation problems under matroid constraints, On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets, Median stable matching for markets with wages, Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods, Agreement toward stability in matching markets, Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result, Finding all stable matchings with couples, Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor, Two algorithms for the student-project allocation problem, A \((2-c\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})\)-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem, The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas, On a lemma of Scarf., Stable schedule matching under revealed preference., The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why., On the stable \(b\)-matching polytope., On the complexity of an expanded Tarski's fixed point problem under the componentwise ordering, Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note, Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints, WARP and combinatorial choice, Antimatroids induced by matchings, The lattice of envy-free matchings, Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis, A college admissions clearinghouse, Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics, The stable \(b\)-matching polytope revisited, Matching with partially ordered contracts, Invariant sets and Knaster-Tarski principle, Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts, Understanding the generalized median stable matchings, The stable roommates problem with choice functions, Almost stable matchings by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm, Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching, A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues, Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments, A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms, Kernels in weighted digraphs, Stable schedule matchings, On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles, Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions, A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions, Blockers and antiblockers of stable matchings, A Matroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas, Recent Developments in Discrete Convex Analysis, A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas, Local Matching Dynamics in Social Networks, On Stable Matchings and Flows, Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid Constraints, The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
