Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source

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Publication:5855055

DOI10.1088/1367-2630/18/6/065008zbMATH Open1456.81161arXiv1803.06045OpenAlexW3099750387WikidataQ62592114 ScholiaQ62592114MaRDI QIDQ5855055FDOQ5855055


Authors: Kiyoshi Tamaki, Marcos Curty, Marco Lucamarini Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 12 March 2021

Published in: New Journal of Physics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06045




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