Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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Publication:5893832
zbMath0523.90095MaRDI QIDQ5893832
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
proper equilibria; Nash equilibrium; P-stability; incomplete information; regular equilibria; essential equilibria; control costs; f- approachability; game in extensive form; game in normal form; perfect equilibria; perturbation in the payoff functions; perturbation in the strategy sets; sequence of games; sequential equilibria
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A05: 2-person games
91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
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