Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5928167
DOI10.1007/BF00138864zbMath1138.91521WikidataQ69435713 ScholiaQ69435713MaRDI QIDQ5928167
Stephen Knack, Philip Keefer, Mancur Olson, Christopher Clague
Publication date: 26 November 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Growth (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00138864
91F10: History, political science
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