On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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Publication:5944742
DOI10.1007/PL00013699zbMath0986.91033MaRDI QIDQ5944742
Publication date: 10 October 2001
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B68: Matching models
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