On decision-theoretic foundations for defaults
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5958391
DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00140-0zbMATH Open0984.68139OpenAlexW2034935732WikidataQ57233884 ScholiaQ57233884MaRDI QIDQ5958391FDOQ5958391
Authors: Ronen Brafman, Nir Friedman
Publication date: 3 March 2002
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(01)00140-0
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- What does a conditional knowledge base entail?
- The logic of conditionals. An application of probability to deductive logic
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A logic for default reasoning
- Non-monotonic logic. I
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Circumscription - a form of non-monotonic reasoning
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The effect of knowledge on belief: Conditioning, specificity and the lottery paradox in default reasoning
- Qualitative probabilities for default reasoning, belief revision, and causal modeling
- Logic-based subsumption architecture
- Nozick's Acceptance Rule and the Lottery Paradox
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: On decision-theoretic foundations for defaults
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5958391)