Target rules for public choice economies on tree networks and in Euclidean spaces

DOI10.1023/A:1012244714511zbMath1015.91024OpenAlexW1575155866MaRDI QIDQ5959823

Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 11 April 2002

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1012244714511

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencypopulation monotonicityreplacement dominationsingle-peaked preferencestarget rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (9)

Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences ⋮ The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks ⋮ Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle ⋮ Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo ⋮ The target location function on finite trees ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle ⋮ Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains ⋮ Generalized target functions on trees

This page was built for publication: Target rules for public choice economies on tree networks and in Euclidean spaces