Evaluation of anonymity and confidentiality protocols using theorem proving

DOI10.1007/S10703-015-0232-5zbMATH Open1331.68028OpenAlexW840673086MaRDI QIDQ5962971FDOQ5962971

Tarek Mhamdi, Osman Hasan, Sofiène Tahar

Publication date: 25 February 2016

Published in: Formal Methods in System Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10703-015-0232-5

zbMATH Keywords

confidentialitytheorem provinginformation leakageanonymitydependable systems and software

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Information theory (general) (94A15) Network protocols (68M12)

Cites Work

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• A theory of type polymorphism in programming
• An introduction to mathematical logic and type theory: To truth through proof.
• On the Formalization of the Lebesgue Integration Theory in HOL
• Assessing security threats of looping constructs
• On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
• Formalization of Entropy Measures in HOL
• Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels

Cited In (3)

• Formalization of Normal Random Variables in HOL
• A Framework for Automatically Checking Anonymity with μCRL
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Uses Software

• ML
• HOL
• ETPS
• GitHub

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