Evaluation of anonymity and confidentiality protocols using theorem proving
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Publication:5962971
DOI10.1007/S10703-015-0232-5zbMATH Open1331.68028OpenAlexW840673086MaRDI QIDQ5962971FDOQ5962971
Authors: Tarek Mhamdi, Osman Hasan, Sofiène Tahar 
Publication date: 25 February 2016
Published in: Formal Methods in System Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10703-015-0232-5
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Cites Work
- A theory of type polymorphism in programming
- An introduction to mathematical logic and type theory: To truth through proof.
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- On the formalization of the Lebesgue integration theory in HOL
- Assessing security threats of looping constructs
- On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Formalization of entropy measures in HOL
- Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (3)
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