Evaluation of anonymity and confidentiality protocols using theorem proving
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Publication:5962971
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5539366 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 107482 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3542687 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2090929 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2090930 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 958048 (Why is no real title available?)
- A theory of type polymorphism in programming
- An introduction to mathematical logic and type theory: To truth through proof.
- Anonymity Protocols as Noisy Channels
- Assessing security threats of looping constructs
- Formalization of entropy measures in HOL
- On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
- On the formalization of the Lebesgue integration theory in HOL
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