Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.009zbMath1347.91131OpenAlexW2227649709MaRDI QIDQ5964690

Patrick Harless

Publication date: 1 March 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

preference aggregationstatus quo ruleswelfare dominance under preference replacement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences ⋮ A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population ⋮ Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: a tale of two rules ⋮ A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model

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