Philosophical Uses of Categoricity Arguments
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Publication:6072007
Abstract: Mathematicians and philosophers have appealed to categoricity arguments in a surprisingly varied range of contexts. One familiar example calls on second-order categoricity in an attempt to show that the Continuum Hypothesis, despite its formal independence, has a determinate truth value, but this does not exhaust the uses of categoricity even in set theory, not to mention its appearance in various roles in discussions of arithmetic. Here we compare and contrast a sampling of these deployments to get a sense of when these arguments tend to succeed and when they tend to fail. Our story begins with two historical landmarks, Dedekind and Zermelo, on arithmetic and set theory, respectively, and ends with two leading contemporary writers, Charles Parsons and the co-authors Tim Button and Sean Walsh, again on arithmetic and set theory, respectively. In between, we pause over the well-known contribution of Georg Kreisel. In each case we ask: what does the author set out to accomplish, philosophically?; what do they actually do (or what can be done), mathematically?; and does what is done (or can be done) accomplish what they set out to do? We find this focus on context illuminating: these authors have qualitatively different philosophical goals, and what works for one might not work for another.
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