Formal and Natural Proof: A Phenomenological Approach
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Publication:6075432
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Cites work
- A concise introduction to mathematical logic
- A Critique of a Formalist-Mechanist Version of the Justification of Arguments in Mathematicians' Proof Practices
- A curious inference
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- Brouwer fixed point theorem in the general case
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- Tracking reason. Proof, consequence, and truth
- What does logic have to tell us about mathematical proofs?
- Why do informal proofs conform to formal norms?
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