Do oligopolistic firms benefit from being forced to act non‐strategically?

DOI10.1111/ijet.12340zbMath1530.91326OpenAlexW4220740152MaRDI QIDQ6076314

Hamideh Esfahani, Unnamed Author

Publication date: 23 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12340

zbMATH Keywords

output constraintsfeedback equilibriumrepeated Cournot oligopolynon-strategic behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices: closed-loop, feedback, and open-loop solutions
• Profitability of horizontal mergers in the presence of price stickiness
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices

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